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The Supreme Court, no longer required by statute to hear every case, would
decide the question of public importance when it decides to grant or deny
certiorari. Moreover, with a single procedure for review, litigants would no
longer be required to choose between one-judge and three-judge courts oil
the uncertain basis of "public importance.1 41 The party seeking review
would be assured of proper jurisdiction.
THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE GRATUITY FUND:
INSURANCE THAT ISN'T INSURANCE:'
MEMBERSHIP in stock and produce exchanges frequently involves forced
participation in a death benefit plan.' Financed by binding assessments
Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vicr., c. 20, § 90; 24 STAT. 379-80
(1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 2, 3 (1946). See ICC v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 145 U.S.
263, 275-7 (1892) ; Great Western Ry. v. Sutton, L.R. 4 H.L. 226, 237 (1869) ; Sr. Rr,.
No. 46, 49th Cong., 1st Sess., 176, 180-2, 198-202 (1886).
Since the common law actions have either been abrogated or strikingly altered and
clarified, the constitutional right to jury trial (which is only an incident of the common
law action, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48-9 (1937)), should no
longer appertain. Cf. Grand Trunk W. Ry. v. Industrial Comm'n, 291 Ill. 167, 125 N.E.
748 (1920) (workmen's compensation); State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65
Wash. 156, 210-11, 117 Pac. 1101, 1119 (1911) (same). Whatever doubt may still re-
main could be clarified by congressional amendment to Section 22 of the Interstate Com-
merce Act taking away the common-law actions and replacing them with wholly statutory
ones. See Pennsylvania R.R. v. Puritan Coal Co., 237 U.S. 121, 129 (1915). The right
to jury trial would then disappear. Cf. State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, .stpra.
The rights of the plaintiff-shipper in reparations cases pose no problem at present
since he waives jury trial when he asks the ICC to award reparations. See Baltimore &
O.R.R. v. Brady, 288 U.S. 448, 458 (1933). Before the district court a jury is available.
But if his alternative were abrogated (see note 39 supra), his right to jury trial should
be treated similarly to that of the carrier.
41. See note 37 spra.
* Estate of Strauss, 13 T.C. 159 (1949).
1. Communications from approximately two dozen stock and produce exchanges in-
dicate that at least one-third, including most of the important ones, have an informal death
benefit .plan. As adopted, these plans vary widely in their mechanics. For instance, the
widows of deceased members connected with the Boston Stock Exchange for more than
twenty years are entitled to $50 assessments against all surviving members. BosToN
STOCX EXcHANGa CoxsT. Art. XX, § 3. The By-Laws of the Omaha Grain Exchange
also provide for payments equivalent to the amount collected from assessments against the
other members. In this case no principal reserve is kept by the Exchange against which
payments may be first made "[i]n order to be not amenable to the Ingurance laws."
Communication to the YAiE LAW JOURNAL from F. P. Manchester, Secretary, Omaha
Grain Exchange, dated December 3, 1949, in Yale Law Library. The Gratuity Fund of
the New York Cotton Exchange assesses each member ten dollars upon the death of a fel-
low member, and the death benefit is the- equivalent of the total assessments which each
[VCOL 9
NOTES
against surviving members, such plans are designed to provide the widows
and orphans of deceased members with financial security. The seventy-
seven year-old Gratuity Plan of the New York Stock Exchange is typical.2
The Exchange constitution binds each member to make a fifteen dollar dona-
tion to a gratuity fund upon joining the Exchange,3 and a like payment on
the death of each fellow member. 4 If he dies while still a member, his nearest
intestate successor 5 receives $20,000 from the fund.
The resemblance of such a plan to insurance is immediately apparent. In
Estate of Strauss,7 however, the Tax Court has indicated that in its opinion
this analogy is merely superficial. The case arose under Section 811(g) of
the federal estate tax which provides for inclusion of insurance proceeds
in a decedent's gross estate.8 The court held that $20,000 received by
Mrs. Strauss from the Stock Exchange's gratuity fund on the death of her
member has contributed during his lifetime. Communication to the YALE L.'v JouraAL
from C. B. Jones, Chairman, Gratuity Fund Committee of the New York Cotton Ex-
change, dated December 1, 1949, in Yale Law Library. And the recently eliminated Gra-
tuity System of the New York Produce Exchange provided for a three dollar assessment
against all members and a graduated rate of payment in relation to the number of years
the deceased was connected with the Exchange. NEw Yonx P oucE EXCHANGE. By-
LAws § 57 (1946). The plan of the Kansas City Board of Trade, providing for $5,000
death benefits, is financed through investment of a principal sum of almost 1$0,000 in the
stock of a subsidiary, the Grain Clearing Co. Communication to the YALE LAW JoURNAL
from W.R. Scott, Executive Vice President, Kansas City Board of Trade, dated Decem-
ber 9, 1949, in Yale Law Library.
2. For a discussion of the plan see Franklin v. Dick, 262 App. Div. 299, 28
N.Y.S2d 426 (1st Dep't.), aff'd without opinion, 287 N.Y. 656, 39 N.E.2d 282 (1941).
3. N.Y. STocK Exc-xca. CoNST. Art. XVI, § 1.
4. Id. Art. XVI, § 2. The fund has always contained sums substantially in e'cess of
that required for current payments. In fact, income derived from investments, unear-
marked original donations, and assessment returns above the requisite $20,000, see note 16
infra, had so swelled the Fund by 1941 that it contained almost $2,000,000. At that time
a constitutional amendment was adopted permitting credits on assessments whenever the
Fund contained at least $500,000. N.Y. STocx ExcHIANGE CoNsr. Art. XVI, § 7. See
Franklin v. Dick, 262 App. Div. 299, 28 N.Y.S2d 426 (1st Dep't. 1941). This obviated
the necessity for any assessments for a number of years. And even today, although the
surplus reserve has been exhausted, continued unearmarked income permits substantial
credits to be given on assessments. Communication to the Ymx LAw JouanAL from D. C.
Jones, Office Counsel, New York Stock Exchange, dated November 29, 1949, in Yale Law
Library. See note 32 infra.
5. The payment is divided between the widow and any surviving issue. If there are
none, the proceeds go to the nearest collateral relatives under the New York intestacy
laws. N. Y. STocK ExcHANca CoNsT. Art. XVI, § 4.
6. "The faith of the Exchange is hereby pledged to pay, within one year after proof
of death of any member, out of the money collected under the provisions of this Article,
the sum of twenty thousand dollars, or so much thereof as may have been collected. ..Y
N.Y. Socn EXCHANGE CoNST. Art. XVI, § 3. Invariably the amount collected is at least
$20,000. See note 16 infra.
7. 13 T.C. 159 (1949).
8. IN. Rv. CoDE § 811(g).
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member-husband was not an insurance proceed and therefore not subject
to tax.9
The basis of the decision was a cryptic test announced by the Supreme
Court in Helvering v. Le Gierse,10 where a participant in an annuity-insurance
scheme was denied the $40,000 exemption then accorded insurance: 11
"Historically and commonly, insurance involves risk-shifting and risk-
distribution." 12 The Tax Court was forced to rely exclusively on this
abstraction, for despite twenty years of stormy litigation in the estate tax
field, the statutory term "insurance" has otherwise gone undefined."3 But
the court's application of the test seems clearly wrong.
Of the two aspects of the Le Gierse test the Tax Court only concerned it-
self with "risk shifting." No risk was shifted, said the court, because the
Exchange was not bound to a definite liability: the widow's right was en-
9. Estate of Strauss, 13 T.C. 159, 166 (1949).
10. 312 U.S. 531 (1941).
11. The test, as originally formulated, was a device to prevent tax evasion. Previous
to 1942, insurance proceeds payable to beneficiaries were granted a forty thousand dollar
exemption before inclusion in a decedent's gross estate. Revenue Act of 1918, § 402(f),
40 STAT. 1097 (1919); Revenue Act of 1921, §402(f), 42 STAT. 279 (1923); Revenue
Act of 1924, § 302(g), 43 STAT. 305 (1925) ; Revenue Act of 1926, § 302(g), 44 STAT. 71
(1927). This was an obvious advantage to a wealthy "prospective decedent." To secure
the exemption, persons too old to purchase ordinary insurance contracts with graduated
premiums, secured combined life insurance annuity policies. In the Le Giersc case, for
instance, one month before her death at age 80, the insured paid $25,000 for an annuity-
insurance contract. Annual payments until death of a sum slightly less than could have
been secured by investment elsewhere were coupled with an insurance policy of $25,000
face value. Since the court felt that this contract was more an investment than an insur-
ance arrangement, the exemption was denied. The proceeds were therefore included in
the gross estate as a gift in contemplation of death. See 1 PAUL, FEDaRAL ESTAvn AlND
GrFr TAXATION § 10.09 (1942) ; Note, 13 RocKY MT. L. REv. 68 (1941).
12. Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 539 (1940) (emphasis added). The Su-
preme Court has most recently applied the rationale in Goldstone v. United States, 325
U.S. 687, 690 (1945). See Meisenholder, Taxation of Annuity Contracts under Estato and
Inheritance Taxes, 39 Micir. L. REv. 856 (1941) ; Notes, 49 YALE L.J. 946 (1940) ; 42
COL. L. REV. 162 (1942).
13. "Insurance" as used in the statute has not received the benefit of congressional
definition. H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1918) ; H.R. Ra,. No. 2333, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 57, 162-3 (1942) ; SEN. RE,. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 234-6 (1942).
And Treasury expansion of the term has never gone beyond a statement that the act is
applicable to "insurance of every description including death benefits paid by fraternal
beneficial societies operating under the lodge system." U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.25
(1942). Moreover, courts have never been faced with the necessity of defining "insurance"
under section 811(g). The considerable pre-1942 litigation under the Section was largely
concerned with what was then the sole condition precedent to inclusion-that the contract be
"taken out by decedent." See note- 11 supra; Bowe, Life Insurance, the Forbidden Fruit,
2 VA:ND. L. REv. 212-224 (1948). The main question raised-whether Congress intended
the condition to mean that the decedent must possess incidents of ownership or merely pur-
chase and pay for the insurance-was settled by a 1942 amendment which incorporated
both requirements in the alternative. Revenue Act of 1942, § 404(g), 56 STAT. 944 (1942).
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forceable only to the extent of the assessments collected on the occasion of
her husband's death. 14 Such reasoning is probably unassailable on the
narrowest of legal levels. On the practical level, however, it ignores com-
pletely the fact that living members are subject to the loss of their Ex-
change seats for failure to meet assessments.' The force of such a sanction
guarantees that funds sufficient to make the $20,000 payment will be avail-
able. 6 In the light of this assurance, it is insignificant that the Exchange is
"legally" bound to pay out only so much as is paid in. The beneficiaries will
in fact receive full payment; therefore the risk of death is effectively shifted.
This conclusion is strengthened when the resemblance of death benefit
plans to assessment insurance is recognized. 17 Assessment insurance is
commonly employed by mutual benefit societies, notably fraternal organiza-
tions. Living policyholders make payments whenever a member dies rather
than periodically.' Payments are equal for all members of the insured
group irrespective of life expectancy. Although the only sanction against
failure to meet an assessment is loss of membership in the plan, assessment
insurance as a risk shifting device has generally been held to satisfy the
most exacting insurance definition, 9 including that of Section 811(g).?,
14. 13 T.C. 159, 165 (1949).
15. N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE CoNsT. Art. X, § 5. If the seat is sold, either by the
member, or his executor, or after confiscation by the Exchange for failure to pay dues,
the Exchange has first lien on the purchase money to the extent of unpaid dues, including
Gratuity Fund assessments. N.Y. STocx EXCHANGE COxST. Art. XI, § 3. See ATVwooD,
Srocy, AND PRODUCE EXCHANGES 40 (2d ed. 1925).
16. The Exchange itself recognizes the force of this sanction since it forwards pay-
ments to the beneficiaries even before the living members are assessed for their "contribu-
tions.' N.Y. STocK EXCHANGE CoNsT. Art. XVI, § 5.
When the assessments against all 1374 living members are met, the Exchange has
actually received $20,610 from which to make the payments. The likelihood of failure to
collect the requisite $20,000 is, therefore, negligible, since this would require default by
more than forty members.
17. Assessment insurance reached its height in popularity during the latter half of
the nineteenth century. HuEmr-,, LIFE INsuRANcE 283 (2d ed. 1925). Its contempo-
rary importance, however, is indicated by the fact that the value of existing assessment
insurance is $353,000,000. Lna INsURAncE FACT Boor 78 (1949).
18. See 1 CooLEY, BRmrs oN INsURANCE 74 (2d ed. 1927).
19. E.g., Ficdin v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 205 Mo. App. 452, 225 S.W. 102
(1920) ; State v. Matthews, 58 Ohio St. 1, 49 N.E. 1034, (1898) ; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Marye, 85 Va. 643, 8 S.E. 481 (1889). See Commonwealth v. Wetherbee, 105 Mass. 149,
161 (1870) : "[An assessment insurance policy] is not the less a contract of mutual insur-
ance upon the life of the assured, because the amount to be paid by the corporation is not a
gross sum, but a sum graduated by the number of members holding similar contracts; nor
because a portion of the premiums is to be paid upon the uncertain periods of the deaths
of such members; nor because, in case of nonpayment of assessments by any member, the
contract provides no means of enforcing payment thereof, but merely declares the contract
to be at an end, and all moneys previously paid by assured, and all dividends and credits
accrued to him, to be forfeited to the company.
"The fact, ... that the object of the organization was benevolent and not speculative,
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In its concern for the "risk shifting" half in the Le Gierse dichotomy, the
Tax Court ignored the "risk distribution" half. The implication that the
two phrases are equivalent does not withstand examination.21 Risk shifting
emphasizes the individual aspect of insurance: the effecting of a contract
between the insurer and insured each of whom gamble on the time the latter
will die. 22 Risk distribution, on the other hand, emphasizes the broader,
social aspect of insurance as a method of dispelling the danger of a potential
loss by spreading its cost throughout a group.23 By diffusing the risks
through a mass of separate risk shifting contracts, the insurer casts his lot
with the law of averages. 24 The process of risk distribution, therefore, is the
very essence of insurance.
The Exchange Gratuity Plan embodies this essential aspect of risk dis-
tribution. The promises of 1374 members to contribute fifteen dollars upon
the death of each of their fellow members not only shifts the risk of financial
loss from the shoulders of the individual member but disseminates the risk
across the entire insured group. Thus the purpose and effect of the Plan is
exactly analogous to insurance under the Le Gierse test.21
A finding, however, that the Plan is insurance in the abstract would not
has no bearing upon the nature and affect of the business conducted and the contracts
made by the corporation."
See also HUEBNER, Lrn I sURANcE 283 (2d ed. 1925); MAcLEAN, LiFE INSURANC
7, 402, 405 (1935).
20. Treasury Decision 5239 applies Section 811(g) to proceeds of insurance in the
form of "death benefits paid by fraternal beneficial societies operating under the lodge sys.
tem." T.D. 5239, 1943 CuiM. BUL. 1081, 1092.
21. Although the two concepts have been generally recognized, most writers on in-
surance, have failed to differentiate clearly between them. See, e.g., 1 PAUL, FEDERAL
ESrAT AND GrT TAXATION § 10.07 (1942). But see note 23 infira.
22. See State v. Towle, 80 Me. 287, 289, 14 Adt. 195, 196 (1888).
23. The distinction is ably pointed up by Cooley. His discussion of the risk shifting
aspect takes this form: "The primary requisite essential to a contract of insurance is the
presence of a risk of loss. The insurer, in return for a consideration paid to him by the
insured, assumes this risk, and when such a risk is assumed by one of the parties to tho
contract, whatever form the contract may take, it is in fact a contract of insurance." 1
CooLEY, Baxns o N INsuRAxE 7 (2d ed. 1927). On the other hand, he notes the risk dis-
tribution aspect thus: "There must, in order that there may be successful insurance, be a
sufficiently large number exposed to the same risk to make it practical and advantageous
to distribute the loss falling upon a few. . . . [T]he business must be regarded as a sys-
tem of distributing losses upon the many who are exposed to the common hazard." Id.
at 8.
24. Ibid.
25. The Board of Tax Appeals once found that the Gratuity Fund was "probably"
insurance under applicable New York Law. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. v. Com-
missioner, 40 B.T.A. 268 (1939). See note 30 infra. But the importance of state defini-
tions of insurance in federal estate taxation has been disaffirmed in favor of controlling
"congressional intent." See Kernochan v. United States, 29 F. Supp. 860, 866 (Ct. CI.
1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 675 (1940); Estate of Wilson, 42 B.T.A. 1196, 1200 (1940).
On this basis, the Tax Court in the Strauss case held that the Central Hanover finding
was not controlling. Estate of Strauss, 13 T.C. 159, 163-4 (1949).
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alone result in taxability of its proceeds. Section 811(g) applies only to
those insurance contracts in which the insured either "possessed . . . in-
cidents of ownership" or, in the alternative, "paid the premiums or other
consideration." 21
But these requirements do not stand in the way of taxability, for the
Gratuity Plan membership qualifies under either test. "Incidents of owner-
ship" include the power to sell, mortgage, assign or otherwise control the
economic use of the policy.? Although a Plan member may not designate
his beneficiary 2 or assign the proceeds, - he does possess the power, by
selling his seat, to realize a financial return and divest his beneficiary of any
right to payments. This control, analogous to securing the cash value of
ordinary insurance, should qualify as an incident of ownership. ' Moreover,
26. I T. Rsv. CODE § 811(g).
The Tax Court held, however, "[i]n view of our conclusion (that the Gratuity plan
failed the test of insurance in the abstract), it is not necessary to discuss the payment of
premiums or incidents of ownership tests of section 811(g)." Estate of Strauss, 13 T.C.
159, 166 (1949).
27. See U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 8127 (1942), as amended by T.D. 5239, 1943 Cu-s.
Bum- 1081.
28. N.Y. STocK EXCHANGE CONsT. Art. XVI, § 4. See note 5 supra.
29. "Nothing herein contained shall be construed as constituting any estate in esse
which can be mortgaged or pledged for the payment of any debts... ." N.Y. STOcK
EXCHANGE CoNsT. Art. XVI, § 6.
30. In Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 40 B.T.A. 268 (1939), the Board of
Tax Appeals assumed that the Gratuity Plan was insurance in the abstract (see note 25
supra) but nevertheless exempted payments from the gross estate. At the time, the inci-
dent of ownership test was the only basis of inclusion. See note 13 mipra. The Board
reasoned that the mere power to divest the "vested" right of a beneficiary to proceeds was
not an incident of ownership, a conclusion which seems valid in light of the exclusion of
more formidable reversionary interests from this category. INT. REv. CooE § 811(g) (2) ;
U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 8127, as amended by T.D. 5239, 1943 CUM- Buuj. 1031, 1093. See
Bingham v. United States, 296 U.S. 211 (1935). But see Bittker, The Church and Spic-
gel Cases: Section 811(c) Gets a New Lease on Life, 58 YALE LJ. 825 (1949) ; Church
and Spiegel: The Legislative Sequel, 59 YALE L.j. 395 (1950) (reversionary interests
under 811 (c)).
But the Board in Central Hanover failed to consider the analogy between selling the
Exchange seat and cashing in a traditional insurance policy, both of which result in an
economic return to the insured and divest the beneficiary of his right to the proceeds.
Moreover, the value of the potential death benefit is frequently a factor which leads a
member to continue his control over his seat. Thus, the experience of the Midwest Stock
Exchange "seemed to indicate that many individuals holding memberships who were not
active in the securities business were inclined to hold their memberships for the gratuity
fund benefits if for no other reason." Communication to the Ywrx LA%,, JoumRAL from
C. E. Ogren, Vice President and Secretary, Midwest Stock Exchange, dated January 17,
1950, in Yale Law Library. In many cases, therefore, a member's reasons for selling his
seat will be exactly the considerations involved in turning in a regular life insurance
policy for its cash value.
U.S. Treas, Reg. 105, § 8127 (1942), as amended by T.D. 5239, 43 Cum. BUL.. 1031,
1094, indicates that this power to receive the cash surrender value of an insurance policy
is an incident of ownership. See H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 57, 163 (1942);
SEN. RP. No. 1631, 77th Conr. 2d Sess. 235 (1942).
